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My first impression when reading Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract: A 
Critique of Stakeholder Theory is that the author does more of the latter part of the title 
(critiquing stakeholder theory) than examining the former (capitalism and corporations). 
While this does not do justice to the book – that addresses very carefully and thoroughly the 
ethical foundations of business in a capitalist system –, Mansell’s declared goal is still a 
“critical analysis of the consistency” (p. 3) of stakeholder theory’s normative grounding. 
Albeit taking a critical stance toward this theory, the book is therefore situated in the vast 
literature on stakeholder theory, that advocates for taking into account not only shareholders’ 
but also stakeholders’ interests in the conduct of business (Donaldson & Preston, 1995; 
Freeman, 1984). The book, generally, contributes to the business and society literature (e.g. 
Carroll, 1979; Jones, 1983; Scherer & Palazzo, 2007) and, specifically, to the long-standing 
debate on corporate purpose (see e.g. Freeman et al., 2004; Jensen, 2002; Sundaram & 
Inkpen, 2004). 
 
To do so, Mansell contrasts stakeholder (corporations should satisfy their stakeholders’ 
interests) and shareholder (maximizing solely shareholder wealth) theories. The author 
spends most of the book examining stakeholder theory, though. Mansell analyzes the logical 
structure of stakeholder theory’s “ethical claims about the proper objectives of business” (p. 
17) and, in particular, the compatibility of the theory’s normative foundations with those of a 
market economy – which stakeholder theorists seem to assume. The main finding of his 
analysis is that stakeholder theory is inconsistent with the ethical principles of a market 
economy and that therefore it has no coherent logical and normative grounding. Therefore, 
Mansell concludes, the purpose of business in a market economy should be to maximize 
shareholder wealth.  
 
The introduction of the book places stakeholder theory in the context of its ‘nemesis’, 
shareholder theory, and provides some information on the endeavor of the book, its 
methodology and structure.  
 
Chapter 2 provides a comprehensive overview of stakeholder theory, with a focus on its 
normative foundations. Mansell shows that despite stakeholder theory being overtly strategic 
(that is, provide managers with ways to ensure the long-term survival of their firms by 
addressing stakeholder interests), it nevertheless builds on an oftentimes tacit normative 
foundation: satisfying stakeholder interests as a moral duty. The author goes on to detail 
normative arguments that justify this position, mostly based on Rawlsian philosophy and 
associated notions of justice and fairness. Some stakeholder theorists apply Rawls’ notion of 
the ‘veil of ignorance’, where stakeholders should act as if they did not know the precise 
stake they have in a corporation. Mansell convincingly shows that this principle does not 
provide normative grounds for stakeholder theory, because it fails to provide a clear 
alternative corporate purpose to shareholder wealth maximization.  
 
Chapter 3 details the philosophical underpinnings of four different strands of stakeholder 
theory. Mansell concludes by showing that these formulations either consider the firm a 
sovereign power (i.e. similar to the state), or assimilate the firm to a citizen with associated 
rights and duties (i.e. “a legal individual, created for commercial purposes, which can own 
and trade property in its own right”, p. 94).  
 
Chapter 4 moves on to describe the market economy, which, according to Mansell’s analysis, 
is based on the underlying notion of trade. The author carefully outlines the ethical principles 
of such a market economy, namely the rights to property and to contract. The author 
carefully shows that, for stakeholder theorists adopting the view of corporations as legal 
persons, the ethical principles of a market economy are not aligned with any other purpose 
than pursuing shareholders’ interests. If stakeholders would also invest property in the 
corporation (shareholders are the only corporate property owners according to “legal and 
historical evidence”, p. 100), the corporation would not be able to enter into contracts with 
stakeholders (e.g. employees, consumers, etc.) because there would be a conflict of interest – 
as “the property rights of the corporation and those who contract with it must be 
distinguishable”, p. 98.  
 
Chapter 5, in turn, addresses the formulations of stakeholder theory that assume that the 
corporation can be assimilated to a sovereign power, a ‘social contract’ between stakeholders. 
In this view, the “corporation is not merely a commercial entity that trades with stakeholders, 
but is an association of all stakeholders united for a mutual purpose” (p. 101, emphasis in 
original). Mansell shows that contrary to citizens that have equal interests and ‘united will’ in 
granting sovereign power to the state, stakeholders do not. Because of these inconsistencies, 
deduces the author, this view of stakeholder theory is also not valid, as “on no grounds […] 
can a corporation legitimately represent in its objectives the interest of any stakeholders other 
than shareholders” (p. 124 – those latter have united will and equal interest as per the 
memorandum of association of the corporation when it was created in the first place). 
 
Chapter 6 develops on ‘shareholder theory’ perspectives and how they refute stakeholder 
theory. Especially, this chapter emphasizes how different strands (consequentialist and 
deontological) of shareholder theory have come to the conclusion that the objective of 
business is to be run according to the interests of shareholders. First, running a business 
according to shareholder interests’ maximize the corporation’s ultimate social value, which 
benefit stakeholders as well. Second, proponents of shareholder theory assume that only 
shareholders have a say in the definition of the corporate objective because it is them who 
invest property in the corporation. Therefore, managers have a contractual obligation to 
pursue those investors’ interests (and only those).  
 
Mansell concludes by first providing a summary of the book’s arguments and structure, and 
then goes on to provide a much needed background on historical notions of the state (as a 
parallel to the short history of the corporation provided in Chapter 4). This historical 
examination shows that stakeholder theory may be misaligned with the normative 
foundations of a market economy because the theory uses a very specific notion of the state – 
at least for those formulations of stakeholder theory that view the corporation as a sovereign 
power. The final word, as one would expect, is that, given the ethical principles of a market 
economy, the only coherent corporate objective is one that satisfies shareholders’ interests. 
 
Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract: A Critique of Stakeholder Theory is 
incredibly thorough in its analysis of the logical structure of stakeholder theory’s normative 
foundations. It builds on a wide range of philosophical sources that underpin stakeholder 
theory or capitalist thinking, such as Kant, Hobbes or Rawls. The book, and despite 
Freeman’s alleged tiredness of the debate on corporate purpose (p. 10), takes this debate 
forward in a significant manner: it goes beyond argumentation by looking at the 
philosophical underpinnings and logical structure of existing arguments. In fact, and even 
though the book is arguably set up as a critique of stakeholder theory, its main contribution 
for me lies in a critique of the normative groundings used by theorists of corporate purpose 
and corporate responsibility in a capitalist system (see also Orlitzky, 2015). 
 
Of course, as with any academic undertaking, there are areas where I wish the author would 
have gone further. I understand that not all of the following points could have realistically 
been incorporated in the book, but let them serve as suggestions for future research. Firstly, I 
found the use of the term ‘shareholder theory’ slightly misleading. As Mansell notes in 
Chapter 6, there are multiple perspectives on the primacy of shareholder interests. A more 
fine-grained and developed analysis (and critique) of those approaches would have been 
welcome, to balance the very detailed critique of stakeholder theory.  
 
Secondly, while one alternative form of organizing for business is considered in Chapter 6 
(‘community interest company’ in the UK), I think the book would have benefited from a 
more thorough examination of the empirical reality of market economies and forms of 
corporations. The rise of partnerships, cooperatives, B-corps, ‘flexible purpose corporations’, 
and other new or renewed forms for business (see e.g. Davis 2013) challenge some of the 
claims of the book. Are those contemporary developments inconsistent as well with the 
ethical principles of a market economy? What would that mean for shareholder and 
stakeholder theories and their normative foundations? 
 
Thirdly, in the same vein, while Chapter 6 provides some critique of ‘shareholder theories’, 
the economic system of today does not correspond to its conceptualization by Enlightenment 
thinkers or 19th (and sometimes even 20th) century philosophers anymore. As noted in the 
book, the separation of ownership and control and the shift to managerial capitalism (among 
others) challenge theses initial theorizations of market economies and corporations. In my 
opinion, the fact that capitalism has evolved since its original conceptualization some 300 or 
400 years ago calls for a consideration of such evolution – much like Mansell does with an 
examination of the historical and legal evolution of the corporation (Chapter 4) or the state 
(in Conclusion). Assuming that the market economy can be taken as a stable construct seems 
a bit far stretched.  
 
Fourth, Mansell’s analysis of the market economy mostly relies on an analysis of trade based 
on classical economics. It seems that a market economy is not interpretable from different 
normative standpoints. But sociological and anthropological advances, for example, have 
shown alternative understandings of exchange, markets and economic systems (e.g. Graeber, 
2001; Lie, 1997). While classical (and neoclassical) economics may be the dominant 
paradigm for understanding the economic system today, alternative paradigms have been 
developed and surely those diverge to some extent in terms of their underlying ethical 
principles (e.g. Etzioni, 1988). In short, I would have appreciated a (brief) discussion of other 
paradigms for understanding the ethical principles of an economic system, and how 
shareholder and stakeholder theories would fit such paradigms.  
 
Finally, and relatedly, what I missed most from the book – as with quite a number of critical 
analyses – is the lack of clear alternatives (although the passage in Chapter 6 on legal 
developments in the UK addresses this point to an extent). I may be misreading the author’s 
intentions here, but even though Mansell seems sympathetic to stakeholder theory’s premise 
(addressing the potential negative externalities of markets and business), there are no clear 
statements of the author’s position on that matter. It is unclear whether Mansell abides by the 
capitalist system, if he considers that a complete reform is needed, or if other paradigms – 
such as the ones mentioned above – can be conceivable and applicable. 
 
To conclude, Capitalism, Corporations and the Social Contract: A Critique of Stakeholder 
Theory is a necessary read for scholars interested in the corporate purpose debate. I learned 
(and learned anew) lots about stakeholder theory specifically, and about the purpose of the 
corporation in market economies more generally. My opening statement that Mansell mostly 
critiques stakeholder theory rather than addressing capitalism, corporations or the social 
contract is therefore misplaced. He definitely does address those concepts – but framed as a 
questioning of the normative grounding of stakeholder theory. This echoes my wish to have 
more of the author’s own perspective and what an alternative may (or may not) be. 
Nevertheless I applaud Mansell’s fruitful attempt at taking the debate on corporate purpose 
forward. I hope this debate will now start looking at contemporary development of markets 
and corporations – so that it can move towards a middle-range theory that corresponds more 
closely to, as well as explain more adequately, the corporate, economic and social realities of 
the 21st century. It is, I think, our moral duty as thinkers to explain the world with theories 
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